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Glossary 
Cause map: A cause map is similar to a cognitive map however it is not composed of an 
individual's perception but rather the views/statements from a number of participants. It   - 2 - 
follows the same formalisms as cognitive mapping but does not reflect cognition as it is 
composite. 
Cognitive map: A cognitive map is a representation of an individual's perception 
(cognition) of an issue. It is graphically depicted illustrating concepts/statements 
connected together with arrows representing causality. They are created using a set of 
established formalisms. 
Complex project: a complex project is a project in which the project behaviours and 
outcomes are difficult to predict and difficult to explain post-hoc. 
Disruption and delay: disruption and delay (D&D) is primarily the consequence of 
interactions which feed on themselves as a result of an initial disruption or delay or 
portfolio of disruptions and delays 




1. Definition of Subject and its Importance 
There are many examples of complex projects suffering massive time and cost overruns. 
If a project has suffered such an overrun there may be a need to understand why it 
behaved the way it did. Two main reasons for this is (i) to gain learning for future 
projects or (ii) because one party of the project wishes to claim compensation from 
another party and thus is trying to explain what occurred during the project. In the latter 
case, system dynamics has been used for the last 30 years to help to understand why 
projects behave the way they do. Its success in this arena stems from its ability to model 
and unravel complex dynamic behaviour that can result in project overruns. Starting from 
the first use of system dynamics in a claim situation in the late 1970’s [2], it has directly 
influenced claim results worth millions of dollars. However, the number of claims which 
system dynamics has been involved in is still small as it is not perceived by project 
management practitioners as a standard tool for analysing projects. System dynamics has 
a lot to offer in understanding complex projects, not only in a post-mortem situation, but 
it could also add value in the pre-project analysis stage and during the operational stage 




In this chapter we discuss the role of system dynamics (SD) modelling in understanding, 
and planning, a complex project.  In particular we are interested in understanding how 
and why projects can go awry in a manner that seems surprising and often very difficult 
to unravel.   
 
When we refer to projects we mean “a temporary endeavour undertaken to create a 
unique product or service”[1]. Projects are a specific undertaking, which implies that they 
are “one-shot”, non-repetitive, time-limited, and, when complex, frequently bring about 
revolutionary (rather than evolutionary) improvements, start (to some extent) without 
precedent, and are risky with respect to customer, product, and project.  If physical 
products are being created in a project, then the product is in some way significantly 
different to previous occasions of manufacturing (for example, in its engineering   - 3 - 
principles, or the expected operating conditions of the product, etc), and it is this feature 
that means there is a need to take a project orientation. 
Complex projects often suffer massive cost overruns. In recent decades those that have 
been publicised relate to large public construction projects, for example airports, bridges, 
and public buildings. Some examples include Denver’s US$5 billion airport that was 
200% overspent [3], the 800 million Danish Kroner Oresund bridge that was 68% 
overspent [4], and the UK’s Scottish Parliament, which was10 times the first budget [5]. 
The Major Projects Association [6] talks of a calamitous history of cost overruns of very 
large projects in the public sector. Flyvberg et al.,[7]  describe 258 major transportation 
infrastructure projects showing 90% of projects overspent.  Morris and Hough [8]  
conclude that “the track record of projects is fundamentally poor, particularly for the 
larger and more difficult ones.… Projects are often completed late or over budget, do not 
perform in the way expected, involve severe strain on participating institutions or are 
cancelled prior to their completion after the expenditure of considerable sums of money.” 
(p.7). 
 
“Complex” projects are ones in which the project behaviours and outcomes are difficult 
to predict and difficult to explain post-hoc. Complex projects, by their nature, comprise 
multiple interdependencies, and involve nonlinear relationships (which are themselves 
dynamic).  For example, choices to accelerate might involve the use of additional 
overtime which can affect both learning curves and productivity as a result of fatigue – 
each of which are non-linear relationships.   In addition many of the important features of 
complex projects are manifested through ‘soft’ relationships – for example managers will 
recognise deteriorating morale as projects become messy and look a failure, but assessing 
the impact of morale on levels of mistakes and rate of working has to be a matter of 
qualitative judgment.  These characteristics are amenable particularly to SD modelling 
which specializes in working with qualitative relationships that are non-linear [9, 10, 11].   
 
It is therefore surprising that simulation modelling has not been used more extensively to 
construct post-mortem analyses of failed projects, and even more surprising because of 
SD’s aptitude for dealing with feedback. Nevertheless the authors have been involved in 
the analysis of 10 projects that have incurred time and cost overruns and PA Consulting 
Group have claimed to have used SD to explain time and cost overruns for over 30 
litigation cases [12]. Although in the mid-1990’s, attempts to integrate SD modelling 
with more typical approaches to project management were emerging, their use has never 
become established within the project management literature or practice [13,14,15]. In 
addition, recognition that the trend towards tighter project delivery and accelerated 
development times meant that parallelism in project tasks was becoming endemic, and 
the impact of increasing parallelism could result in complex feedback dynamics where 
vicious cycles exist [16].  These vicious cycles are often the consequence of actions taken 
to enforce feedback control designed to bring a project back on track. 
 
As project managers describe their experiences of projects going wrong they will often 
talk of these “vicious cycles” occurring, particularly with respect to the way in which 
customer changes seem to generate much more rework than might be expected, and that   - 4 - 
the rework itself then generates even more rework.  Consider a small part of a manager’s 
description of what he sees going on around him:  
 
“For some time now we’ve been short of some really important information the 
customer was supposed to provide us.  As a consequence we’ve been forced to 
progress the contract by making engineering assumptions, which, I fear, have led 
to more mistakes being made than usual.  This started giving us more rework than 
we’d planned for.  But, of course, rework on some parts of the project has meant 
reopening work that we thought we’d completed, and that, in turn has reopened 
even more past work.  Engineering rework has led to the need for production 
work-arounds and so our labour in both engineering and production have been 
suffering stop/starts and interruptions – and each time this happens they take time 
to get back up to speed again.  This has led to productivity dropping because of 
unnecessary tasks, let alone productivity losses from the workforce getting fed-up 
with redoing things over and over again and so just becoming demoralized and so 
working slower.  Inevitably all the rework and consequential productivity losses 
have put pressure on us to accelerate the project forcing us to have to make more 
engineering assumptions and do work-arounds.” 
 
Figure 1 shows a ‘cause map’ of the arguments presented by this project manager – the 
words used in the map are those used by the project manager and the arrows represent the 
causality described by the manager.  This description is full of vicious cycles (indeed 
there are 35 vicious cycles discussed – see figure 1) all triggered by a shortage of 
customer furnished information and resulting in the rework cycle [17-21]) and the need to 
accelerate in order to keep the project on schedule.  Using traditional project management 
models such as Critical Path Method/Network Analysis cannot capture any of the 
dynamics depicted in figure 1, but SD simulation modelling is absolutely appropriate 
[22]. 
 
So, why has SD modelling been so little used?  Partly it is because in taking apart a failed 
project the purpose is usually associated with a contractor wishing to make a claim for 
cost-overruns.  In these circumstances the traditions of successful claims and typical 
attitudes of courts tend to determine the approach used.  A ‘measured-mile’ approach is 
common, where numerical simplicity replaces the need for a proper understanding [23].    
 
It was not until the early 1980’s that the use of simulation modelling became apparent 
from publications in the public-domain.  The settlement of a shipbuilding claim
2 
prompted interest in SD modelling and 4], in the same year, reported on the use of 
management science modelling for the same purpose.  It was not surprising that this 
modelling for litigation generated interest in modelling where the purpose was oriented to 
learning about failed projects (indeed the learning can follow from litigation modelling 
[25], although it rarely does). 
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Figure 1: Cause map showing the interactions described by a project manager and 
illustrating the feedback loops resulting from the complex dynamics behaviour of a 
project under duress. The arrows represent causality. 
 
 
As figure 1 demonstrates, it is not easy to understand fully the complex dynamic 
behaviour of a project under duress.  Few would realize that 35 feedback loops are 
encompassed in the description that led to figure 1.  Indeed one of the significant features 
of complex projects is the likelihood of underestimating the complexity due to the 
dynamics generated by disruptions. 6] has reported on the more specific difficulty of 
understanding feedback behaviour and research in the field of managerial judgment 
reinforces the difficulties of biases unduly influencing judgment [27].  
 
In the work presented here we presume that there is a customer and a contractor, and 
there is a bidding process usually involving considerations of liquidated damages for 
delays and possibly strategic reputational consequences for late delivery.  Thus, we 
expect the project to have a clear beginning and an end when the customer (internal or 
external) signs off a contract. Finally, we do not explore the whole project business life 
cycle, but that part where major cost overruns occur: thus, we start our consideration 
when a bid is to be prepared, consider development and manufacturing or construction, 
but stop when the product of the project is handed over to the customer. 
 
Thus, in this chapter we shall be concerned specifically with the use of SD to model the 
consequences of disruptions and delays. Often these disruptions are small changes to the   - 6 - 
project, for example design changes [28].  The work discussed here is the consequence of 
12 years of constructing detailed SD simulation models of failed complex projects.  The 
first significant case was reported in Ackermann et al.[10]  and Bennett et al. [29] . In 
each case the prompt for the work was the reasonable prospect of the contractor making a 
successful claim for damages.  In all the cases the claim was settled out of court and the 
simulation model played a key role in settling the dispute. 
 
The chapter will firstly consider why modelling disruption and delay (D&D) is so 
difficult. It will discuss what is meant by the term D&D and the typical consequences of 
D&D. This will be examined using examples from real projects that have suffered D&D. 
The contribution of SD modelling to the analysis of D&D and thus to the explanation of 
project behaviour will then be discussed. A process of modelling which has been 
developed over the last 12 years and one that provides a means of modelling and 
explaining project behaviour will be introduced. This process involves constructing both 
qualitative cause maps and quantitative system dynamics models. The chapter will 




3. Disruption and Delay 
 
(The following contains excerpts from Eden at al. [22] which provides a full discussion 
on the nature of D&D) 
 
The idea that small disruptions can cause serious consequences to the life of a major 
project, resulting in massive time and cost overruns, is well established. The terms 
‘disruption and delay’ or ‘delay and disruption’ are also often used to describe what has 
happened on such projects.  However, although justifying the direct impact of disruptions 
and delays is relatively easy, there has been considerable difficulty in justifying and 
quantifying the claim for the indirect consequences. Our experience from working on a 
series of such claims is that some of the difficulty derives from ambiguity about the 
nature of disruption and delay (D&D). We now consider what we mean by D&D before 
moving onto considering the types of consequences that can result from the impact of 
D&D. 
 
3.1 What is a disruption? 
Disruptions are events that prevent the contractor completing the work as planned. Many 
disruptions to complex projects are planned for at the bid stage because they may be 
expected to unfold during the project. For example, some level of rework is usually 
expected, even when everything goes well, because there will always be ‘normal’ errors 
and mistakes made by both the contractor and client.  The disruption and delay that 
follows would typically be taken to be a part of a risk factor encompassed in the base 
estimate, although this can be significantly underestimated [30].  However, our 
experience suggests that there are other types of disruptions that can be significant in 
their impact and are rarely thought about during original estimating.  When these types 
of disruptions do occur, their consequences can be underestimated as they are often seen   - 7 - 
by the contractor as aberrations with an expectation that their consequences can be 
controlled and managed.  The linkage between risk assessment and the risks as potential 
triggers of D&D is often missed [31]. Interferences with the flow of work in the project is 
a common disruption. For example, when a larger number of design comments than 
expected are made by the client an increased number of drawings need rework. However 
it also needs to be recognized that these comments could have been made by the 
contractors own methods engineering staff. In either case, the additional work needed to 
respond to these comments, increases the contractor’s workload and thus requires 
management to take mitigating actions if they still want to deliver on time. These 
mitigating actions are usually regarded as routine and capable of easily bringing the 
contract back to plan, even though they can have complex feedback ramifications. 
 
Probably one of the most common disruptions to a project comes when a customer or 
contractor causes changes to the product (a Variation or Change Order). For example, the 
contractor may wish to alter the product after engineering work has commenced and so 
request a direct change. However, sometimes changes may be made unwittingly. For 
example, a significant part of cost overruns may arise where there have been what might 
be called ‘giveaways’. These may occur because the contractor’s engineers get excited 
about a unique and creative solution and rather than sticking to the original design, 
produce something better but with additional costs. Alternatively, when the contractor 
and customer have different interpretations of the contract requirements unanticipated 
changes can occur. For example, suppose the contract asks for a door to open and let out 
50 passengers in 2 minutes, but the customer insists on this being assessed with respect to 
the unlikely event of dominantly large, slow passengers rather than the contractor’s 
design assumptions of an average person. This is often known as ‘preferential 
engineering’. In both instances there are contractor and/or customer requested changes 
that result in the final product being more extensive than originally intended. 
  
The following example, taken from a real project and originally cited in Eden et al. [30], 
illustrates the impact of a client induced change to the product: 
 
Project 1: The contract for a ‘state of the art’ train had just been awarded. Using 
well-established design principles – adopted from similar train systems – the 
contractor believed that the project was on track. However within a few months 
problems were beginning to emerge. The client team was behaving very 
differently from previous experience and using the contract specification to 
demand performance levels beyond that envisioned by the estimating team. One 
example of these performance levels emerged during initial testing, 6 months into 
the contract, and related to water tightness.  It was discovered that the passenger 
doors were not sufficiently watertight. Under extreme test conditions a small (tiny 
puddle) amount of water appeared. The customer demanded that there must be no 
ingress of water, despite acknowledging that passengers experiencing such 
weather would bring in more water on themselves than the leakage.  
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The contractor argued that no train had ever met these demands, citing that most 
manufacturers and operators recognized that a small amount of water would 
always ingress, and that all operators accepted this. Nevertheless the customer 
interpreted the contract such that new methods and materials had to be considered 
for sealing the openings. The dialogue became extremely combative and the 
contractor was forced to redesign. An option was presented to the customer for 
their approval, one that would have ramifications for the production process. The 
customer, after many tests and after the verdict of many external experts in the 
field, agreed to the solution after several weeks.  Not only were many designs 
revisited and changed, with an impact on other designs, but also the delays in 
resolution impacted the schedule well beyond any direct consequences that could 
be tracked by the schedule system (Primavera
*) or costs forecasting system. 
 
3.2 What is a delay? 
Delays are any events that will have an impact on the final date for completion of the 
project. Delays in projects come from a variety of sources. One common source is that of 
the client-induced delay. Where there are contractual obligations to comment upon 
documents, make approvals, supply information or supply equipment, and the client is 
late in these contractually-defined duties, then there may be a client-induced delay to the 
expected delivery date (although in many instances the delay is presumed to be absorbed 
by slack).  But also a delay could be self-inflicted: if the sub-assembly designed and built 
did not work, a delay might be expected.  
 
The different types of client-induced delays (approvals, information, etc) have different 
effects and implications. Delays in client approval, in particular, are often ambiguous 
contractually.  A time to respond to approvals may not have been properly set, or the 
expectations of what was required within a set time may be ambiguous (for example, in 
one project analysed by the authors the clients had to respond within n weeks - but this 
simply meant that they sent back a drawing after n weeks with comments, then after the 
drawing was modified, they sent back the same drawing after a further m weeks with 
more comments). Furthermore, excessive comments, or delays in comments can cause 
chains of problems, impacting, for example, on the document approval process with sub-
contractors, or causing over-load to the client’s document approval process.  
 
If a delay occurs in a project, it is generally considered relatively straightforward to cost.  
However, ramifications resulting from delays are often not trivial either to understand or 
to evaluate. Let us consider a delay only in terms of the CPM (Critical Path Method), the 
standard approach for considering the effects of delays on a project [32]. The 
consequences of the delay depend on whether the activities delayed are on the Critical 
Path. If they are on the Critical Path, or the delays are sufficient to cause the activities to 
become on the critical path, it is conceptually easy to compute the effect as an Extension 
Of Time (EOT) [33]. However, even in this case there are complicating issues. For 
example; what is the effect on other projects being undertaken by the contractor? When 
this is not the first delay, then to which schedule does the term “critical path” refer?  To 
the original, planned programme, which has already been changed or disrupted, or to the 
                                                 
* www.primavera.com   - 9 - 
“as built”, actual schedule? Opinions differ here.  It is interesting to note that, “the 
established procedure in the USA [of using as-built CPM schedules for claims] is almost 
unheard of in the UK” [33]. 
 
If the delay is not on the Critical Path then, still thinking in CPM terms, there are only 
indirect costs. For example, the activities on the Critical Path are likely to be resource 
dependent, and it is rarely easy to hire and fire at will - so if non-critical activities are 
delayed, the project may need to work on tasks in a non-optimal sequence to keep the 
workforce occupied; this will usually imply making guesses in engineering or production, 
requiring later re-work, less productive work, stop/starts, workforce overcrowding, and so 
on.  
 
The following example, taken from a real project, illustrates the impact of a delay in 
client furnished information to the project: 
 
Project 2: A state of the art vessels project had been commissioned which 
demanded not only the contractor meeting a challenging design but additionally 
incorporating new sophisticated equipment. This equipment was being developed 
in another country by a third party. The client had originally guaranteed that the 
information on the equipment would be provided within the first few months of 
the contract – time enough for the information to be integrated within the entire 
design. However time passed and no detailed specifications were provided by the 
third party – despite continual requests from the contractor to the client.  
 
As the project had an aggressive time penalty the contractor was forced to make a 
number of assumptions in order to keep the design process going. Further 
difficulties emerged as information from the third party trickled in demanding 
changes from the emerging design. Finally manufacturing which had been geared 
up according to the schedule were forced to use whatever designs they could 
access in order to start building the vessel. 
 
3.3 Portfolio effect of many disruptions 
It is not just the extent of the disruption or delay but the number of them which may be of 
relevance. This is particularly the case when a large number of the disruptions and/or 
delays impact immediately upon one another thus causing a portfolio of changes.  These 
portfolios of D&D impacts result in effects that would probably not occur if only one or 
two impacts had occurred. For example, the combination of a large number of impacts 
might result in overcrowding or having to work in poor weather conditions (see example 
below).  In these instances it is possible to identify each individual item as a contributory 
cause of extra work and delay but not easy to identify the combined effect. 
 
The following example, taken from another real project, illustrates the impact of a series 
of disruptions to the project: 
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Project 3: A large paper mill was to be extended and modernised. The extension 
was given extra urgency by new anti-pollution laws imposing a limit on emissions 
being enacted with a strict deadline.   
 
Although the project had started well, costs seemed to be growing beyond 
anything that made sense given the apparent minor nature of the disruptions. 
Documents issued to the customer for ‘information only’ were changed late in the 
process. The customer insisted on benchmarking proven systems, involving visits 
to sites working with experimental installations or installations operating under 
different conditions in various different countries.  In addition there were many 
changes of mind about where equipment should be positioned and how certain 
systems should work. Exacerbating these events was the circumstance of both the 
customer’s and contractor’s engineers being co-located, leading to ‘endless’ 
discussions and meetings slowing the rate of both design and (later) 
commissioning. 
 
Relations with the customer, who was seen by the contractor to be continually 
interfering with progress of the project, were steadily deteriorating.  In addition, 
and in order to keep the construction work going, drawings were released to the 
construction team before being fully agreed. This meant that construction was 
done in a piecemeal fashion, often inefficiently (for example, scaffolding would 
be put up for a job, then taken down so other work could proceed, then put up in 
the same place to do another task for which drawings subsequently had been 
produced). As the construction timescale got tighter and tighter, many more men 
were put on the site than was efficient (considerable overcrowding ensued) and so 
each task took longer than estimated.  
  
As a result the project was behind schedule, and, as it involved a considerable 
amount of external construction work, was vulnerable to being affected by the 
weather. In the original project plan (as used for the estimate) the outer shell 
(walls and roof) was due to be completed by mid-Autumn. However, the project 
manager now found himself undertaking the initial construction of the walls and 
roofing in the middle of winter! As chance would have it, the coldest winter for 
decades, which resulted in many days being lost while it was too cold to work. 
The combination of the particularly vicious winter and many interferences 
resulted in an unexpectedly huge increase in both labour hours and overall delay. 
Overtime payments (for design and construction workers) escalated. The final 
overspend was over 40% more than the original budget 
 
 
3.4 Consequences of disruptions and delays 
Disruption and delay (D&D) is primarily the consequence of interactions which feed on 
themselves as a result of an initial disruption or delay or portfolio of disruptions and 
delays. If an unexpected variation (or disruption) occurs in a project then, if no 
intervention was to take place, a delivery delay would occur.  In an attempt to avoid this 
situation, management may choose to take actions to prevent the delay (and possible   - 11 - 
penalties). In implementing these actions, side-effects can occur which cause further 
disruptions. These disruptions then cause further delays to the project. In order to avoid 
this situation, additional managerial action is required. Thus, an initial disruption has led 
to a delay, which has led to a disruption, which has led to a further delay. A positive 
feedback loop has been formed, where both disruption and delay feed back on themselves 
causing further disruptions and delays. Due to the nature of feedback loops, a powerful 
vicious cycle has been created which, if there is no alternative intervention, can escalate 
with the potential of getting ‘out of control’.   It is the dynamic behaviour caused by these 
vicious cycles which can cause severe disruption and consequential delay in a project.  
 
The dynamic behaviour of the vicious cycles which are responsible for much of the D&D 
in a project make the costing of D&D very difficult. It is extremely difficult to separate 
each of the vicious cycles and evaluate their individual cost. Due to the dynamic 
behaviour of the interactions between vicious cycles, the cost of two individual cycles 
will escalate when they interact with one another, thus disruptions have to be costed as 
part of a portfolio of disruptions.   
 
 
Figure 2: Excerpt from a cause map showing some of the consequences of disruption and 
delay in Project 2. Boxed statements are specific illustrations with statements underlined 
representing generic categories (e.g. changes of mind). Statements in bold text represent 
the SD variables with the remainder providing additional context. All links are causal 
however those in bold illustrate sections of a feedback loop. The numbers at the 
beginning of concept are used as reference numbers in the model. 
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Returning to Project 2, the vessel case, as can be seen in figure 2, the client caused both 
disruptions (continuous changes of mind) and delays (late permission to use a particular 
product). Both of these caused the contractor to undertake rework, and struggle with 
achieving a frozen (fixed) design. These consequences in turn impacted upon staff morale 
and also developed as noted above dynamic behaviour – where rework resulted in more 
submissions of designs, which led to further comments, some of which were inconsistent 
and therefore led to further rework. As mentioned in the introduction, the rework cycle 
[17-21] can be a major driver of escalating feedback within a complex project.  
 
 
3.5 Managerial actions and the consequences of D&D 
The acceleration of disrupted projects to avoid overall project delays is common practice 
by managers who are under pressure from the client and/or their own senior management 
to deliver on time. However, the belief that this action will always help avoid delays is 
naive as it does not take into account an appreciation of the future consequences that can 
be faced. For example, one typical action designed to accelerate a project is to hire new 
staff. In doing so, some of the difficulties which may follow are:  
•  New staff take time to become acquainted with both the project and thus their 
productivity is lower than that of an existing skilled worker. 
•  New staff require training on the project and this will have an impact on the 
productivity of existing staff. 
•  Rather than hiring new staff to the organisation, staff may be moved from other parts 
of the organisation. This action results in costs to other projects as the other project is 
short of staff and so may have to hire workers from elsewhere, thereby suffering 
many of the problems discussed above. 
  
Many of the outcomes of this action and other similar actions can lead to a reduction in 
expected productivity levels. Low productivity is a further disruption to the project 
through a lack of expected progress. If management identifies this lack of progress, then 
further managerial actions may be taken in an attempt to avoid a further delay in delivery. 
These actions often lead to more disruptions, reinforcing the feedback loop that had been 
set up by the first actions.  
 
Two other common managerial actions taken to avoid the impact of a disruption on 
delivery are (i) the use of overtime and (ii) placing pressure on staff in an attempt to 
increase work rate. Both of these actions can also have detrimental effects on staff 
productivity once they have reached particular levels. Although these actions are used to 
increase productivity levels, effects on fatigue and morale can actually lead to a lowering 
of productivity via a slower rate of work and/or additional work to be completed due to 
increased levels of rework [21, 34]. This lowering of productivity causes a delay through 
lack of expected progress on the project, causing a further delay to delivery. Management 
may then attempt to avoid this by taking other actions which in turn cause a disruption 
which again reinforces the feedback loop that has been set up. 
 
 
4. Analysing D&D and Project Behaviour   - 13 - 
The above discussion has shown that whilst D&D is a serious aspect of project 
management, it is a complicated phenomenon to understand. A single or a series of 
disruptions or delays can lead to significant impacts on a project which cannot be easily 
thought through due to human difficulties in identifying and thinking through feedback 
loops [26, 35]. This makes the analysis of D&D and the resulting project behaviour 
particularly difficult to explain. 
 
SD modelling has made a significant contribution to increasing our understanding of why 
projects behave in the way they do and in quantifying effects. There are two situations in 
which this is valuable: the claim situation, where one side of the party is trying to explain 
the project’s behaviour to the other (and, usually, why the actions of the other party has 
caused the project to behave in the way it has) and the post-project situation, where an 
organisation is trying to learn lessons from the experience of a project.  In the case of a 
claim situation, although it has been shown that SD modelling can meet criteria for 
admissibility to court [36], there are a number of objectives which SD, or any modelling 
method, would need to address [37]. These include the following: 
 
1.  Prove causality - show what events triggered the D&D and how the triggers of D&D 
caused time and cost overruns on the project. 
2.  Prove the ‘quantum’ - show that the events that caused D&D created a specific time 
and cost over-run in the project. Therefore, there is a need to replicate over time the 
hours of work due to D&D that were over-and-above those that were contracted, but 
were required to carry out the project. 
3.  Prove responsibility - show that the defendant was responsible for the outcomes of 
the project. Also to demonstrate the extent to which plaintiff’s management of the 
project was reasonable and the extent that overruns could not have been reasonably 
avoided.  
4.  All of the above have to be proved in a way which will be convincing to the several 
stakeholders in a litigation audience. 
 
Over the last 12years the authors have developed a model building process that aims to 
meet each of these purposes. This process involves constructing qualitative models to aid 
the process of building the ‘case’ and thus help to prove causality and responsibility 
(purposes 1 and 3). In addition, quantitative system dynamics models are involved in 
order to help to prove the quantum (purpose 2). However, most importantly, the process 
provides a structured, transparent, formalized process from “real world” interviews to 
resulting output which enables multiple audiences, including multiple non-experts as well 
as scientific/expert audiences to appreciate the validity of the models and thus gain 
confidence in these models and the consulting process in which they are embedded 
(purpose 4).The process is called the ‘Cascade Model Building Process’. The next section 
describes the different stages of the model building process and some of the advantages 
of using the process.  
 
5. Cascade Model Building Process 
(The following contains excerpts from Howick et al. [38], which contains a full 
description of the Cascade Model Building process)   - 14 - 
 
The ‘Cascade Model Building Process’ involves four stages (see Figure 3) each of which 









































Figure 3: The Cascade Model Building Process 
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5.1 Stage 1: qualitative cognitive and cause map  
The qualitative cognitive maps and /or project cause map aim to capture the key events 
that occurred on the project, for example a delay as noted above in the vessel example in 
Project 2. The process of initial elicitation of these events can be achieved in two ways. 
One option is to interview, and construct cognitive maps [39-41] for each participant’s 
views.   Here the aim is to gain a deep and rich understanding that taps the wealth of 
knowledge of each individual.  These maps act as a preface to getting the group together 
to review and assess the total content represented as a merged cause map [42] in a 
workshop setting. The second option is to undertake group workshops where participants 
can contribute directly, anonymously and simultaneously, to the construction of a cause 
map.  The participants are able to ‘piggy back’ off one another, triggering new memories, 
challenging views and developing together a comprehensive overview [43].  As 
contributions from one participant are captured and structured to form a causal chain, this 
process triggers thoughts from others and as a result a comprehensive view begins to 
unfold. In Project 1, this allowed the relevant design engineers (not just those whose 
responsibility was the water tight doors, but also those affected who were dealing with 
car-body structure, ventilation, etc), methods personnel and construction managers to 
surface a comprehensive view of the different events and consequences that emerged. 
 
The continual development of the qualitative model, sometimes over a number of group 
workshops, engenders clarity of thought predominantly through its adherence to the 
coding formalisms used for cause mapping [44]. Members of the group are able to debate 
and consider the impact of contributions on one another. Through bringing the different 
views together it is also possible to check for coherency – do all the views fit together or 
are there inconsistencies? This is not uncommon as different parts of the organizations 
(including different discipline groups within a division e.g. engineering) encounter 
particular effects. For example, during an engineering project, manufacturing can often 
find themselves bewildered by engineering processes – why are designs so late. However, 
the first stage of the cascade process enables the views from engineering, methods, 
manufacturing, commissioning etc to be integrated. Arguments are tightened as a result, 
inconsistencies identified and resolved and detailed audits (through analyses and features 
in the modelling software) undertaken to ensure consistency between both modelling 
team and model audience. In some instances the documents generated through reports 
about the organizational situation can be coded into a cause map and merged into the 
interview and workshop material [45]. 
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Figure 4: Excerpt from a cause map showing some of the conversations regarding the 
water ingress situation in Project 1. As with figure 2, statements that have borders are the 
illustrations, those with bold font represent variables with the remainder detailing 
context. Dotted arrows denote the existence of further material which can be revealed at 
anytime. 
 
The cause map developed at this stage is usually large – containing up to 1000 nodes.  
Computer supported analysis of the causal map can inform further discussion. For 
example, it can reveal those aspects of causality that are central to understanding what 
happened. Events that have multiple consequences for important outcomes can be 
detected. Feedback loops can be identified and examined.  The use of software facilitates 
the identification of sometimes complex but important feedback loops that follow from 
the holistic view that arises from the merging of expertise and experience across many 
disciplines within the organization. 
 
The resulting cause map from stage 1 can be of particular use in proving causality. For 
example, figure 4 represents some of the conversations made regarding the water ingress 
situation described in the above case. In this figure, consequences such as additional 
engineering effort and engineering delays can be traced back to events such as client 
found water seeping out of door. 
 
 
5.2 Stage 2: cause map to influence diagram   - 17 - 
The causal model produced from stage 1 is typically very extensive. This extensiveness 
requires that a process of ‘filtering’ or ‘reducing’ the content be undertaken – leading to 
the development of an Influence Diagram (ID) (the second step of the cascade process). 
Partly this is due to the fact that many of the statements captured whilst enabling a 
detailed and thorough understanding of the project, are not relevant when building the SD 
model in stage 4 (as a result of the statements being of a commentary like nature rather 
than a discrete variable). Another reason is that for the most part SD models comprise 
fewer variables/auxiliaries to help manage the complexity (necessary for good modelling 
as well as comprehension).  
 
The steps involved in moving from a cause map to an ID are as follows: 
 
Step 1: Determining the core/endogenous variables of the ID 
 
(i) Identification of feedback loops: It is not uncommon to find over 100 of these (many 
of these may contain a large percentage of common variables) when working on large 
projects with contributions from all phases of the project.  
 
(ii) Analysis of feedback loops: Once the feedback loops have been detected they are 
scrutinized to determine a) whether there are nested feedback ‘bundles’ and b) whether 
they traverse more than one stage of the project. Nested feedback loops comprise a 
number of feedback loops around a particular topic where a large number of the 
variables/statements are common but with variations in the formulation of the feedback 
loop. Once detected, those statements that appear in the most number of the nested 
feedback loops are identified as they provide core variables in the ID model. 
 
Where feedback loops straddle different stages of the process for example from 
engineering to manufacturing note is taken. Particularly interesting is where a feedback 
loop appears in one of the later stages of the project e.g. commissioning which links back 
to engineering. Here care must be taken to avoid chronological inconsistencies – it is easy 
to link extra engineering hours into the existing engineering variable however by the time 
commissioning discover problems in engineering, the majority if not all engineering 
effort has been completed.  
 
Step 2: Identifying the triggers/exogenous variables for the ID 
The next stage of the analysis is to look for triggers – those statements that form the 
exogenous variables in the ID. Two forms of analysis provide clues which can 
subsequently be confirmed by the group: 
 
(i) The first analysis focuses on starting at the end of the chains of argument (the tails) 
and laddering up (following the chain of argument) until a branch point appears (two or 
more consequences). Often statements at the bottom of a chain of argument are examples 
which when explored further lead to a particular behaviour e.g. delay in information, 
which provides insights into the triggers. 
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(ii) The initial set of triggers created by (i) can be confirmed through a second type of 
analysis – one which takes two different means of examining the model structure for 
those statements that are central or busy. Once these are identified they can be examined 
in more detail through creating hierarchical sets based upon them and thus “tear drops” of 
their content. Each of these teardrops is examined as possible triggers.  
 
Step 3: Checking the ID 
Once the triggers and the feedback loops are identified care is taken to avoid double 
counting – where one trigger has multiple consequences some care must be exercised in 
case the multiple consequences are simple replications of one another.  
 
The resulting ID is comparable to a ‘causal loop diagram’ [46] which is often used as a 
pre-cursor to a SD model. From the ID structure it is possible to create “stories” where a 




Figure 5: A small section of an ID from Project 2 showing mitigating actions (italics), 
triggers (underline) and some of the feedback cycles 
 
 
5.3 Stage 3: influence diagram to system dynamics influence diagram (SDID) 
When a SD model is typically constructed after producing a qualitative model such as an 
ID (or causal loop diagram), the modeller determines which of the variables in the ID 
should form the stocks and flows in the SD model, then uses the rest of the ID to   - 19 - 
determine the main relationships that should be included in the SD model. However when 
building the SD model there will be additional variables/constants that will need to be 
included in order to make it ‘work’ that were not required when capturing the main 
dynamic relationships in the ID. The SDID is an influence diagram that includes all 
stocks, flows and variables that will appear in the SD model and is, therefore a qualitative 
version of the SD model.  It provides a clear link between the ID and the SD model. 
The SDID is therefore far more detailed than the ID and other qualitative models 
normally used as a pre-cursor to a SD model. 
 
Methods have been proposed to automate the formulation of a SD model from a 
qualitative model such as a causal loop diagram [47-49] and for understanding the 
underlying structure of a SD model [50]. However, these methods do not allow for the 
degree of transparency required to enable the range of audiences involved in a claim 
situation, or indeed as part of an organizational learning experience, to follow the 
transition from one model to the next. The SDID provides an intermediary step between 
an ID and a SD model to enhance the transparency of the transition from one model to 
another for the audiences. This supports an auditable trail from one model to the next. 
 
The approach used to construct the SDID is as follows: 
 
The SDID is initially created in parallel with the SD model. As a modeller considers how 
to translate an ID into a SD model, the SDID provides an intermediary step.  For each 
variable in the ID, the modeller can do either of the following: 
(i)  Create one variable in the SD & SDID: If the modeller wishes to include the 
variable as one variable in the SD model, then the variable is simply recorded 
in both the SDID and the SD model as it appears in the ID.  
(ii)  Create multiple variables in the SD & SDID:  To enable proper quantification 
of the variable, additional variables need to be created in the SD model. These 
variables are then recorded in both the SD model and SDID with appropriate 
links in the SDID which reflect the structure created in the SD model. 
 
The SDID model forces all qualitative ideas to be placed in a format ready for 
quantification. However, if the ideas are not amenable to quantification or contradict one 
another, then this step is not possible. As a result of this process, a number of issues 
typically emerge including the need to add links and statements and the ability to assess 
the overall profile of the model though examining the impact of particular categories on 
the overall model structure. This process can also translate back into the causal model or 
ID model to reflect the increased understanding. 
 
 
5.4 Stage 4: the system dynamics simulation model 
The process of quantifying SD model variables can be a challenge, particularly as it is 
difficult to justify subjective estimates of higher-level concepts such as “productivity” 
[51]. However, moving up the cascade reveals the causal structure behind such concepts 
and allows quantification at a level that is appropriate to the data-collection opportunities 
available. Figure 6, taken from the ID for Project 1, provides an example. The   - 20 - 
quantitative model will require a variable “productivity” or “morale”, and the analyst will 
require estimation of the relationship between it and its exogenous and (particularly) 
endogenous causal factors. But while the higher-level concept is essential to the 
quantitative model, simply presenting it to the project team for estimation would not 
facilitate justifiable estimates of these relationships. 
 




3 Difficulty due to
lack of basic design
freeze
4 Performing design
work out of order
5 loss of morale
6 overtime
 
Figure 6 – Section of an ID from Project 1 showing the factors affecting productivity 
 
 
5.5 Reversing the cascade 
The approach of moving from stage 1 through to stage 4 can increase understanding and 
stimulate learning for all parties. However, the process of moving back up the cascade 
can also facilitate understanding between the parties. For example, in Figure 7 the idea 
that a company was forced to use subcontractors and thus lost productivity might be a 
key part of a case for lawyers. The lawyers and the project team might have come at 
Figure 7 as part of their construction of the case. Moving back up from the ID to the 
Cause Map (i.e. Figure 7 to Figure 8) as part of a facilitated discussion not only helps the 
parties to come to an agreed definition of the (often quite ill-defined) terms involved, it 
also helps the lawyers understand how the project team arrived at the estimate of the 
degree of the relationship. Having established the relationship, moving through the SDID 
(ensuring well-defined variables etc) to the SD model enables the analysts to test the 
relationships to see whether any contradictions arise, or if model behaviours are 
significantly different from actuality, and it enables comparison of the variables with data 
that might be collected by (say) cost accountants. Where there are differences or 
contradictions, the ID can be re-inspected and if necessary the team presented with the 
effect of the relationship within the SD model explained using the ID, so that the ID and 
the supporting cause maps can be re-examined to identify the flaws or gaps in the 
reasoning. Thus, in this example, as simulation modellers, cost accountants, lawyers and 
engineers approach the different levels of abstraction, the cascade process provides a   - 21 - 
unifying structure within which they can communicate, understand each other, and equate 
terms in each other’s discourse. 
 
 





Figure 7 – Section of an ID from Project 1 indicating the influence of the use of 
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Figure 8 – Section of a Cause Map from Project 1 explaining the relationship between the 




5.6 Advantages of the cascade 
The Cascade integrates a well-established method, cause mapping, with SD. This 
integration results in a number of important advantages for modelling to explain project 
behaviour: 
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(i) Achieving comprehensiveness  
Our experience suggests that one of the principal benefits of using the cascade process 
derives from the added value gained through developing a rich and elaborated qualitative 
model that provides the structure (in a formalized manner) for the quantitative modelling. 
The cascade process immerses users in the richness and subtlety that surrounds their view 
of the projects and ensures involvement and ownership of all of the qualitative and 
quantitative models.  The comprehensiveness leads to a better understanding of what 
occurred, which is important due to the complex nature of D&D, and enables effective 
conversations to take place across different organizational disciplines.   
 
The process triggers new contributions as memories are stimulated and both new material 
and new connections are revealed.  The resultant models thus act as organizational 
memories providing useful insights into future project management (both in relation to 
bids and implementation). These models provide more richness and therefore an 
increased organizational memory when compared to the traditional methods used in 
group model building for system dynamics models [for example 52]. However this 
outcome is not untypical of other problem structuring methods [53]. 
 
(ii) Testing the veracity of multiple perspectives 
The cascade’s bi-directionality enabled the project team’s understandings to be tested 
both numerically and from the perspective of the coherency of the systemic portrayal of 
logic. By populating the initial quantitative model with data [10] rigorous checks of the 
validity of assertions were possible. 
 
In a claim situation, blame can be the fear of those participating in accounting for history 
and often restricts contributions [44].  When initiating the cascade process, the use of 
either interviews or group workshops increases the probability that the modelling team 
will uncover the rich story rather than partial explanations or as is often the case with 
highly politicized situations, ‘sanitized’ explanations.  By starting with ‘concrete’ events 
that can be verified, and exploring their multiple consequences, the resultant model 
provides the means to reveal and explore the different experiences of various 
stakeholders in the project.  
 
(iii) Modelling transparency 
By concentrating the qualitative modelling efforts on the capture and structuring of 
multiple experiences and viewpoints the cascade process initially uses natural language 
and rich description as the medium which facilitates generation of views and enables a 
more transparent record to be attained. 
 
There are often insightful moments as participants viewing the whole picture realize that 
the project is more complex than they thought.  This realization results in two advantages. 
The first is a sense of relief that they did not act incompetently given the circumstances 
i.e. the consequences of D&D took over – which in turn instils an atmosphere more 
conducive to openness and comprehensiveness [see 44]. The second is learning – 
understanding the whole, the myriad and interacting consequences and in particular the   - 23 - 
dynamic effects that occurred on the project (that often acts in a counter-intuitive 
manner) provides lessons for future projects.  
 
(iv)Common understanding across many audiences 
Claim situations involve numerous stakeholders, with varying backgrounds. The cascade 
process promotes ownership of the models from this mixed audience. For example, 
lawyers are more convinced by the detailed qualitative argument presented in the cause 
map (stage 1) and find this part of greatest utility and hence engage with this element of 
the cascade. However, engineers get more involved in the construction of the quantitative 
model and evaluating the data encompassed within it.    
 
A large, detailed system dynamics model can be extremely difficult to understand for 
many of the stakeholders in a claim process [54]. However, the rich qualitative maps 
developed as part of the cascade method are presented in terms which are easier for 
people with no modelling experience to understand. In addition, by moving back up the 
cascade, the dynamic results that are output by the simulation model are given a 
grounding in the key events of the project, enabling the audience to be given fuller 
explanations and reasons for the D&D that occurred on the project.   
 
Using the cascade method, any structure or parameters that are contained in the 
simulation model can be easily, and quickly, traced back to information gathered as a part 
of creating the cognitive maps or cause maps. Each contribution in these maps can then 
normally be traced to an individual witness who could defend that detail in the model. 
This auditable trail can aid the process of explaining the model and refuting any attacks 
made on the model.  
 
(v) Clarity 
The step-by-step process forces the modeller to be clear in what statements mean. Any 
illogical or inconsistent statements highlighted, require the previous stage to be revisited 
and meanings clarified, or inconsistencies cleared up. This results in clear, logical 
models. 
 
(vi) Confidence building 
As a part of gaining overall confidence in a model, any audience for the model will wish 
to have confidence in the structure of the model [for example 55-58]. When assessing 
confidence levels in a part of the structure of a SD model, the cascade process enables 
any member of the ‘client’ audience to clearly trace the structure of the SD model 
directly to the initial natural language views and beliefs provided from individual 
interviews or group sessions. 
 
Scenarios are also an important test in which the confidence of the project team in the 
model can be considerably strengthened. Simulation is subject to the demands to 
reproduce scenarios that are recognisable to the managers capturing a portfolio of 
meaningful circumstances that occur at the same time, including many qualitative aspects 
such as morale levels. For example, if a particular time-point during the quantitative 
simulation is selected, clearly the simulated values of all the variables, and in particular   - 24 - 
the relative contributions of factors in each relationship, can be output from the model. If 
we consider figure 6, the simulation might show that at a particular point in a project, loss 
of productivity is 26% and that the loss due to:  
 “Use of subcontractors”is 5% 
 “Difficulty due to lack of basic design freeze”is 9% 
 “Performing design work out of order”is 3% 
 “loss of morale”is 5% 
 “overtime”is 4% 
 
Asking the project team their estimates of loss of productivity at this point in time, and 
their estimation of the relative contribution of these five factors, will help to validate the 
model. In most cases this loss level is best captured by plotting the relative levels of 
productivity against the time of critical incidents during the life the project.  Discussion 
around this estimation might reveal unease with the simple model described in figure 6, 
which will enable discussion around the ID and the underlying cause map, either to 
validate the agreed model, or possibly to modify it and return up the cascade to further 
refine the model. In this scenario, validation of the cascade process provides a unifying 
structure within which the various audiences can communicate and understand each 
other.  
 
The Cascade Model Building Process provides a rigorous approach to explaining why a 
project has behaved in a certain way. The cascade uses rich, qualitative stories to give a 
grounding in the key events that drive the behaviour of the project. In addition, it 
provides a quantifiable structure that allows the over time dynamics of the project to be 
described. The Cascade has therefore contributed significantly in understanding why 
projects behave in the way they do.  
 
This chapter has focussed on the role of SD modelling in explaining the behaviour of 
complex projects. The final two sections will consider the implications of this work and 
will explore potential future directions for the use of SD modelling of projects.  
 
 
6. Implications for Development 
 
So what is the current status of SD modelling of projects? What is the research agenda for 
studying projects using SD? Below we consider each aspect of the project life-cycle in 
turn, to suggest areas where SD modelling may be applied, and to consider where further 
work is needed. 
 
The first area is pre-project risk analysis. Risk analysis traditionally looks at risks 
individually, but looking at the systemicity in risks has clear advantages [59]. Firstly, the 
use of cause mapping techniques by an experienced facilitator, aided by software tools, is 
a powerful means of drawing out knowledge of project risk from an individual manager 
(or group of managers), enhancing clarity of thought, allowing investigation of the 
interactions between risks, and enhancing creativity. It is particularly valuable when used 
with groups, bringing out interactions between the managers and helping to surface   - 25 - 
cultural differences. And it clearly enables analysis of the systemicity, in particular 
identification of feedback dynamics, which can help explicate project dynamics in the 
ways discussed above. The influence of such work has led to the ideas of cause maps, 
influence diagrams and SD to be included into risk practice standard advice (the UK 
“PRAM” Guide, edition 2 [60] – absent from Edition 1). In one key example [31], the 
work described above enabled the team to develop a ‘Risk Filter’ in a large multi-national 
project-based organisation, for identifying areas of risk exposure on future projects and 
creating a framework for their investigation. The team reviewed the system after a few 
years; it had been used by 9 divisions, on over 60 major projects, and completed by 450 
respondents; and it was used at several stages during the life of a project to aid in the risk 
assessment and contribute to a project database. The system allowed investigation of the 
interactions between risks, and so encouraged the management of the causality of 
relationships between risks, rather than just risks, thus focusing attention on those risks 
and causality that create the most frightening ramifications on clusters of risks, as a 
system, rather than single items. This also encouraged conversations about risk mitigation 
across disciplines within the organisation. Clearly cause mapping is useful in risk 
analysis, but there are a number of research questions that follow, for example: 
-  In looking at possible risk scenarios, what are appropriate methodologies to organise 
and facilitate heterogenous groups of managers? And how technically can knowledge 
of systemicity and scenarios be gathered into one integrated SD model and enhance 
understanding? [61]  
-  How can SD models of possible scenarios be populated to identify key risks? How 
does the modelling cascade help in forward-looking analysis? 
-  There are many attempts to use Monte-Carlo simulation to model projects, without 
taking the systemic issues into account – leading to models which can be seriously 
misleading [62]. SD models can give a much more realistic account of the effect of 
risks – but how can essentially deterministic SD models as described above be 
integrated into a stochastic framework to undertake probabilistic risk analyses of 
projects which acknowledges the systemicity between the risks and the systemic 
effects of each risk? 
-  The use of SD is able to identify structures which give projects a propensity for the 
catastrophic systemic effects discussed in the Introduction. In particular, the three 
dimensions of structural complexity, uncertainty, and severe time-limitation in 
projects can combine together to cause significant positive feedback. However, 
defining metrics for such dimensions still remains an important open question. While 
a little work has been undertaken to give operational measures to the first of these [for 
example 63, 64], and de Meyer et al. [65] and Shenhar and Dvir [66] suggest selecting 
the management strategy based on such parameters, there has been little success so far 
in quantifying these attributes. The use of the SD models discussed above needs to be 
developed to a point where a project can be parameterised to give quantitatively its 
propensity for positive feedback. 
-  Finally, SD modelling shows that the effects of individual risks can be considerably 
greater than intuition would indicate, and the effects of clusters of risks particularly 
so. How can this be quantified so that risks or groups of risks can be ranked in 
importance to provide prioritisation to managers? Again, Howick et al. [61] gives 
some initial indications here, but more work is needed.   - 26 - 
 
The use of SD in operational control of projects has been less prevalent (Lyneis et al., 
[12] refers to and discusses examples of where it has been used). For a variety of reasons, 
SD and the traditional project management approach do not match well together. 
Traditional project-management tools look at the project in its decomposed pieces in a 
structured way (networks, work breakdown structures, etc); they look at operational 
management problems at a detailed level; SD models aggregate into a higher strategic 
level and look at the underlying structure and feedback. Rodrigues and Williams [67] 
describe one attempt at an integrated methodology, but there is scope for research into 
how work with the SD paradigm can contribute to operational management of projects, 
and Williams [68] provides some suggestions for hybrid methods.  
 
There is also a more fundamental reason why SD models do not fit in easily into 
conventional project management. Current project management practice and discourse is 
dominated by the “Bodies of Knowledge” or BoKs [69], which professional project 
management bodies consider to be the core knowledge of managing projects [1, 70], 
presenting sets of normative procedures which appear to be self-evidently correct. 
However, there are three underlying assumptions to this discourse [71]. 
-  Project Management is self-evidently correct: it is rationalist [72] and normative [73].  
-  The ontological stance is effectively positivist [74].  
-  Project management is particularly concerned with managing scope in individual parts 
[75].  
These three assumptions lead to three particular emphases in current project management 
discourse and thus in the BoKs [71]: 
-  A heavy emphasis on planning [73, 76]  
-  An implication of a very conventional control model [77].  
-  Project management is generally decoupled from the environment [78].  
The SD modelling work provided explanations for why some projects severely over-run, 
which clash with these assumptions of the current dominant project management 
discourse.  
-  Unlike the third assumption, the SD models show behaviour arising from the complex 
interactions of the various parts of the project, which would not be predicted from an 
analysis of the individual parts of the project [79]  
-  Against the first assumption, the SD models show project behaviour which is complex 
and non-intuitive, with feedback exacerbated through management response to project 
perturbations, conventional methods provide unhelpful or even disbeneficial advice 
and are not necessarily self-evidently correct. 
-  The second assumption is also challenged. Firstly, the models differ from the BoKs in 
their emphasis on, or inclusion of, “soft” factors, often important links in the chains of 
causality. Secondly, they show that the models need to incorporate not only “real” 
data but management perceptions of data and to capture the socially constructed 
nature of “reality” in a project. 
 
The SD models tell us why failures occur in projects which exhibit complexity [63] – that 
is, when they combine structural complexity [80] – many parts in complex combinations – 
and uncertainty, in project goals and in the means to achieve those goals [81]. Goal 
uncertainty in particular is lacking in the conventional project management discourse [74,   - 27 - 
82], and it is when uncertainty affects a structurally complex traditionally-managed 
project that the systemic effects discussed above start to occur. But there is a third factor 
identified in the SD modelling. Frequently, events arise that compromise the plan at a 
faster rate than that at which it is practical to re-plan. When the project is heavily time-
constrained, the project manager feels forced to take acceleration actions. A structurally 
complex project when perturbed by external uncertainties can become unstable and 
difficult to manage, and under time-constraints dictating acceleration actions when 
management has to make very fast and sometimes very many decisions, the catastrophic 
over-runs described above can occur. Work from different direction seeking to establish 
characteristics that cause complexity projects come up with similar characteristics [for 
example 66]. But the SD modelling explains how the tightness of the time-constraints 
strengthen the power of the feedback loops which means that small problems or 
uncertainties can cause unexpectedly large effects; it also shows how the type of under-
specification identified by Flyvberg et al. [4] brings what is sometimes called “double 
jeopardy” – under-estimation (when the estimate is elevated to the status of a project 
control-budget) which leads to acceleration actions that then cause feedback which 
causes much greater over-spend than the degree of under-estimation. 
 
Because of this, the greatest contribution that SD has made – and perhaps can make – is 
to increase our understanding of why projects behave in the way they do. There are two 
situations in which this is valuable: the claim situation, where one side of the party is 
trying to explain the project’s behaviour to the others (and, usually, why the actions of 
the other party has caused the project to behave in the way it has) and the post-project 
situation, where an organisation is trying to learn lessons from the experience of a 
project. 
 
The bulk of the work referred to in this chapter comes in the first of these, the claim 
situation. However, while these have proved popular amongst SD modellers, they have 
not necessarily found universal acceptance amongst the practicing project-management 
community. Work is needed therefore in a number of directions. These will be discussed 
in the next section. 
 
 
7. Future Directions 
 
We have already discussed the difficulty that various audiences can have in 
comprehending a large, detailed system dynamics model [54], and that gradual 
explanations that can be given by working down (and back up) the cascade to bring 
understanding to a heterogeneous group (which might include jurors, lawyers, engineers 
and so on) and so link the SD model to key events in the project. While this is clearly 
effective, more work is needed to investigate the use of the cascade.  In particular, ways 
in which the cascade can be most effective in promoting understanding, in formalising 
the methodology and the various techniques mentioned above to make it replicable, as 
well as how best to use SD here (Howick [54] outlines nine particular challenges the SD 
modeller faces in such situations). Having said this, it is still the case that many forums in 
which claims are made are very set in conventional project-management thinking, and we   - 28 - 
need to investigate more how the SD methods can be combined with more traditional 
methods synergistically, so that each supports the other [see for example 83]. 
 
Significant unrealised potential of these methodologies are to be found in the post-project 
“lessons learned” situation. Research has shown many problems in learning generic 
lessons that can be extrapolated to other projects, such as getting to the root causes of 
problems in projects, seeing the underlying systemicity, and understanding the narratives 
around project events (Williams [84], which gives an extensive bibliography in the area). 
Clearly, the modelling cascade, working from the messiness of individual perceptions of 
the situation to an SD model, can help in these areas. The first part of the process (Figure 
3), working through to the cause map, has been shown to enhance understanding in many 
cases; for example, Robertson and Williams [85] describe a case in an insurance firm, 
and Williams [62] gives an example of a project in an electronics firm, where the 
methodology was used very “quick and dirty” but still gave increased understanding of 
why a (in that case successful) project turned out as it did, with some pointers to lessons 
learned about the process. However, as well as formalisation of this part of the 
methodology and research into the most effective ways of bringing groups together to 
form cause maps, more clarity is required as to how far down the cascade to go and the 
additional benefits that the SD modelling brings. “Stage 4” describes the need to look at 
quantification at a level that is appropriate to the data-collection opportunities available, 
and there might perhaps be scope for SD models of parts of the process explaining 
particular aspects of the outcomes. Attempts to describe the behaviour of the whole 
project at a detailed level may only be suitable for the claims situation; there needs to be 
research into what is needed in terms of Stages 3 and 4 for gaining lessons from projects 
(or, if these Stages are not carried out, how the benefits such as enhanced clarity and 
validity using the cause maps, can be gained). 
 
One idea for learning lessons from projects used by the authors, following the idea of 
simulation “learning labs”, was to incorporate learning from a number of projects 
undertaken by one particular large manufacturer into a simulation learning “game” [25]. 
Over a period of 7 years, several hundred Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Directors and 
Project Managers from around the company used the simulation tool as a part of a series 
of senior management seminars, where it promoted discussion around the experience and 
the effects encountered, and encouraged consideration of potential long-term 
consequences of decisions, enabling cause and effect relationships and feedback loops to 
be formed from participants’ experiences. More research is required here as to how such 
learning can be made most effective. 
 
SD modelling has brought a new view to project management, enabling understanding of 
the behaviour of complex projects that was not accessible with other methods. The 
chapter has described methodology for where SD has been used in this domain. This last 
part of the chapter has looked forward to a research agenda into how the SD work needs 
to be developed to bring greater benefits within the project-management community.  
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